Bilateral Free Trade Agreements – How do Countries Choose Partners? by Singh, Suresh
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements – 
How do Countries Choose Partners?
Suresh Singh*
Abstract
While the debate on whether countries should or should not sign trade agreements with selected 
partners continues, governments have significantly stepped up the rate at which they enter into 
such agreements.  A number of such agreements have been signed lately and many more are 
under negotiation. Multinational firms get impacted by these agreements irrespective of whether 
these  are  beneficial  to  the participating  economies  in  particular  or  to  the world  economy in 
general. Bilateral free trade agreements constitute a very large proportion of the trade agreements 
between countries. Knowing which two countries are more likely to sign a free trade agreement 
can help multinational firms minimize risks or maximize opportunities arising from the recent 
proliferation of such agreements. This paper finds that geographical distance and relative strength 
of industry pressure groups are two factors that govern which two countries are more likely to 
enter into a bilateral free trade agreement with each other. 
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Introduction
“Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have become in recent years a very prominent feature of  
the Multilateral Trading System (MTS). Between January 2005 and December 2006 a further 55  
RTAs have been notified to the WTO raising the total number of RTAs notified and in force to  
214.  In  addition  to  these,  many more  agreements  are  currently  being  negotiated  and being  
considered.  The  impasse  in  the  Doha  Development  Agenda  (DDA)  negotiations  is  further 
strengthening Members' resolve to conclude such agreements and indeed a flurry of new RTA 
initiatives has emerged in recent months whose effects will be felt in the years to come.”
- World Trade Organization (WTO) Report, The Changing Landscape of RTAs; 2006 Update 
Figure 1. All Regional Trade Agreements notified to the GATT/WTO (1948-2006), by year of 
entry into force 
Source: WTO Report, The Changing Landscape of RTAs: 2006 Update 
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The fact that the wisdom of governments signing RTAs has been vigorously debated by scholars 
(Bhagwati & Panagariya 1996) is little consolation for multinational firms who get impacted by 
such agreements whether or not these are economically beneficial to the signatories in particular 
or to the world in general. For these firms, what governments actually do is equally important if 
not more than what governments should do (Krugman 1991). The risks or opportunities arising 
from the recent proliferation of RTAs can be proactively managed if it is possible to anticipate 
such  agreements  in  advance.  Bilateral  free  trade  agreements  (FTAs)  constitute  a  very  large 
portion of RTAs and are therefore the focus of attention in this paper. The objective is to find the 
main factors that determine which two countries are more likely to sign a bilateral FTA.  
Limitations of Prior Research
The impact of the RTAs on the economies of the participating (and non-participating) countries 
has been extensively studied since Viner (1950). Very little attention has been paid however, 
across disciplines, to the factors that determine which countries are more likely to enter into such 
agreements with each other. The author could find only two empirical studies that looked at this 
question. Rooted in international relations, Mansfield, Milner & Rosendorff (2002) claimed to 
conduct “one of the first direct examinations of the effects of regime type on the establishment of 
trade agreements” and found that democratic states are more likely to conclude trade agreements. 
Baier  and  Bergstrand  (2004)  claimed  to  be  “the  first  systematic  empirical  analysis  of  the 
economic determinants of the formation of FTAs”. While both these studies recognized the role 
of special interest groups on the trade policy of the governments, none of them incorporated the 
relative  strength  of  these  groups  in  their  model.  This  paper  makes  it  the  main  construct  of 
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interest, inspired by the theoretical model of the politics of free trade agreements developed by 
Grossman & Helpman (1995) that emphasized the interaction between industry special-interest 
groups and the government.   
This paper also addresses some of the methodological limitations of the two studies mentioned 
above. While Mansfield et al. (2002) included different types of RTAs in the same sample, both 
the studies treated bilateral and multilateral agreements at par. As a result, an agreement between 
a given country with the European Union (EU), which is a customs union among many different 
countries, was assumed equivalent to a number of bilateral agreements between that country and 
all  the  members  of  EU.  This  can  potentially  confound  the  results  and  make  interpretation 
difficult. This paper therefore focuses only on bilateral FTAs. 84 percent of the total RTAs in 
force as of December 2006 were FTAs and bilateral agreements accounted for 80 per cent of all 
RTAs notified and in force; 94 per cent of those signed and under negotiation; and 100 per cent 
of those at a proposal stage (WTO Report, The changing landscape of RTAs: 2006 Update). It 
follows that bilateral FTAs constitute a major portion of the total RTAs in force and their share is 
expected to increase considerably in future. It is therefore worthwhile to study bilateral FTAs 
only. 
Baier & Bergstrand (2004) adopted a static approach assuming that “each country pair makes a 
decision in 1996 to form or not form an FTA, or to enforce or not enforce an FTA formed prior 
to  1996”  (page  34).  This  paper,  in  contrast,  has  taken  a  dynamic  approach  by  taking  into 
consideration the year a FTA came into force and using it as the benchmark for the calculation of 
other independent variables.
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Finally, these two previous studies used data prior to 1997. As is evident from Figure 1, a large 
number of RTAs have been signed after this period. Specifically,  data before 1997 is heavily 
biased towards multilateral agreements since bilateral FTAs are relatively recent. As a result, the 
latest story of bilateral FTAs remain largely untold e. g. all the bilateral FTAs signed by Japan 
and all but one signed by USA are not included in the analysis. There are other problems as 
regards to bilateral FTAs before 1997 which shall be discussed in the following sections.
Hypotheses 
Following the standard practice of international  economists,  Baier and Bergstrand (2004) has 
adopted a general  equilibrium model assuming that governments maximize the welfare of its 
citizens. It implies that while signing a FTA with a partner, governments consider not only the 
impact on the trade between the two countries but also the impact on the trade with the rest of the 
world and try to maximize their total trade and not just the trade with the FTA partner.  These 
assumptions  make  the  governments  pure  economic  agents  who  have  all  the  information, 
incentives and capability to calculate the general equilibrium outcomes and to pursue the welfare 
maximization path. While this approach is suited for understanding whether governments should 
or should not do RTAs, it  may not be appropriate  to explain how governments  act in actual 
practice. As Krugman (1991: 6) noted, “The motives of governments as they engage in trade 
negotiations  are  by no means  adequately  described  by the  idea  that  they maximize  national 
welfare”. This paper therefore uses a partial equilibrium model instead where the governments 
try to maximize trade with the FTA partner even if it may not lead to net increase in its overall 
trade.  Governments may be interested in bilateral  FTAs with certain partners for strategic or 
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political reasons and therefore may prefer more trade with them even if it comes at the cost of 
trade with others.      
Bilateral FTAs reduce only the tariff cost between countries but there are other costs of trade – 
transportation costs, non-tariff costs like quotas, transaction costs, currency risk etc. (Anderson 
and Wincoop 2004). A FTA is worthwhile only if tariff costs are a major portion of the total 
costs of trade between the negotiating countries.  If other costs of trade remain very high, no 
significant increase in bilateral trade shall be achieved by removing the tariffs. 
The overwhelming success of the gravity model in explaining international trade, shows that the 
total  cost  of trade increases dramatically  with increasing distance due to an increase in  both 
transportation costs as well as other costs which include costs of communication and costs of 
non-familiarity of remote countries and their institutions (Frankel, Stein & Wei 1995). It follows 
therefore that tariff costs shall dramatically reduce as a proportion of total costs of trade with 
increasing distance between countries. It would make sense therefore for countries to do FTAs 
with neighbors than with remote countries because for remote countries the total costs of trade 
shall  remain high even after  the tariff  costs  are  removed i.  e.  a FTA shall  not result  in any 
significant increase in bilateral trade. 
Hypothesis 1: Countries are more likely to do bilateral FTAs with partners that are 
geographically close. 
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It  remains  to  be  explained  as  to  how  governments  choose  among  partners  that  are  all 
geographically close. The role of political pressure groups has been widely recognized as a major 
influence  on  the  FTA decisions  of  governments.  Grossman  & Helpman  (1995)  developed  a 
model of the politics of FTAs that emphasizes the interaction of these special interest groups and 
the  government.  The  main  pressure  groups  are  the  exporters,  the  importers  and  the  import 
competing producers. Exporters and importers should view a FTA positively because it reduces 
their costs of exports or imports by reducing tariffs. Import competing producers on the other 
hand are hurt by a FTA because it exposes them to foreign competition. Ordinary consumers do 
not  play  a  significant  role  in  shaping  the  outcome  of  a  FTA  negotiation  (Krugman  1991, 
Grossman & Helpman 1995) due to the problem of collective action (Olson 1965). It follows 
therefore that a country will agree for a bilateral FTA only when the strength of exporters and 
importers combined will be greater than the strength of the import competing producers. 
This  paper  uses  the  dollar  value  of  exports  and  imports  as  proxies  for  the  strength  of  the 
exporters and importers.  Let EXPORTS be the total exports from country A to country B and 
IMPORTS be  the  total  imports  to  country  A from country  B.  A portion  of  IMPORTS,  say 
COMPETE_IMPORTS, shall compete with the import competing producers in country A and the 
remaining will be non-competing imports, say NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS . For country A to 
agree  to  a  bilateral  FTA  with  country  B,  the  sum  of  EXPORTS  and 
NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS should be greater than COMPETE_IMPORT. 
The following conditions therefore must hold for country A to agree to a deal with country B:- 
(1) IMPORTS = COMPETE_IMPORTS + NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS, and 
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(2) EXPORTS + NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS > COMPETE_IMPORTS 
Country A can have a high trade surplus, a high trade deficit or a balanced trade with country B. 
These cases can be analyzed as follows: 
a. High trade surplus: High trade surplus implies that EXPORTS >> IMPORTS and using 
condition (1), EXPORTS >> COMPETE_IMPORTS + NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS 
Therefore condition (2) above will be satisfied for any value of NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS 
and country A shall be highly willing to sign a bilateral FTA. 
b. High trade deficit: High trade deficit implies that EXPORTS << IMPORTS and using 
condition (1), EXPORTS << COMPETE_IMPORTS + NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS 
Therefore condition (2) above will be satisfied only for large values of 
NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS. Country A shall be willing to sign a bilateral FTA only for large 
values for NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS. 
c. Balanced trade: Balanced trade implies that EXPORTS = IMPORTS and using condition(1), 
EXPORTS = COMPETE_IMPORTS + NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS 
Therefore condition (2) above will be satisfied even for small values of 
NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS. Country A shall therefore be willing to sign a bilateral FTA even 
for small values of NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS. 
Since a high trade surplus of country A automatically means a high trade deficit of country B, it 
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follows that in case of a high imbalance of trade between country A and country B, a bilateral 
FTA  shall  be  signed  only  if  NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS  forms  a  major  portion  of  the 
IMPORTS for the country in deficit but if the trade is balanced, bilateral FTA is feasible even if 
NON_COMPETE_IMPORTS is a small proportion of the IMPORTS. 
Hypothesis 2: Countries are more likely to sign a bilateral FTA with each other if their 
mutual trade is balanced. 
Data & Analysis 
A list of all the bilateral FTAs that are notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in 
force as of February 2008 was obtained from the web-site of the WTO. Agreements involving 
regimes which are not independent countries (e. g. Serbia and Montenegro, Faroe Islands and 
Palestine) were excluded. Moreover, agreements prior to 1997 were removed as most of them (11 
out of 13) were between former Soviet Union republics which came into existence only after 
1991 and therefore had governments and political-economic structures which were newly born. 
The trade data for these countries was either not available or not very reliable. The remaining list 
provided the 42 countries that have signed one or more bilateral FTAs. These 42 countries were 
paired two at a time to obtain 861 potential bilateral FTAs. Out of these 861 pairs, those pairs 
were  eliminated  which  involved  countries  that  are  already  part  of  a  multilateral  FTA  and 
therefore have no reason to sign a bilateral FTA. Some other pairs got eliminated for lack of 
reliable trade data. A final sample of 746 pairs of countries was thus obtained. The great-circle-
distance  between these pairs  of countries  in  nautical  miles  (DISTANCE) was obtained  from 
Google maps. The exports-imports data was obtained from the United Nations Commodity Trade 
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Statistics Database. For any one country in each pair, the ratio of the dollar value of exports to 
and imports from the partner (TRADE BALANCE) was calculated. For country pairs that have 
actually signed an agreement, the export-import ratio was calculated for one year previous to the 
year the FTA came into force (or closest previous year when data was unavailable). For the rest 
of the pairs, the median year i. e. 2001 was used. To obtain a common scale for these ratios, 
reciprocal  of  all  values  greater  than  one  was taken.  This  was  possible  because  the  order  of 
countries in the pair was immaterial. 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
The descriptive  statistics  is  shown in Table  1.  A probit  regression was used to  estimate  the 
model. The results have been tabulated in Table 2. DISTANCE was highly significant and had a 
negative coefficient as expected. TRADE BALANCE was also found to be significant and had a 
positive coefficient as expected. 
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Distance Trade Balance
Min 70 0.00004
1Q 1772 0.06163
Median 4252 0.26158
Mean 4265 0.32910
3 Q 6439 0.54575
Max 10550 0.99624
Std Dev 2677 0.29230
Table 2. Probit estimation of the likelihood of bilateral FTAs
The predicted probabilities are tabulated in Table 3. At a distance of 500 nautical miles, chances 
of a bilateral FTA increases from about one in every ten for highly imbalanced trade (TRADE 
BALANCE = 0.1) to about one in every four for highly balanced trade (TRADE BALANCE = 
1).  Increasing distance decreases  the probability  of a bilateral  FTA rapidly.  At a distance of 
10500 nautical miles, the chances of an agreement reduce to about one in every twenty five even 
for highly balanced trade (TRADE BALANCE = 1).
Table 3. Predicted probabilities of bilateral FTA
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TRADE BALANCE
DISTANCE 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
500 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.24
2500 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
4500 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
6500 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
8500 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
10500 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Coefficient Std Error
Intercept -1.23*** 0.15110
DISTANCE -0.00011*** 0.00003
TRADE BALANCE 0.57* 0.22760
Null deviance 412.59  on 745  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance 388.93  on 743  degrees of freedom
AIC 394.93
Significance *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to find out the factors that influence the likelihood of a bilateral 
FTA between two potential partners. The results show that the geographical distance between 
countries is a significant barrier against bilateral FTA relationships. Among the potential partners 
that are at a convenient distance apart, those with balanced mutual trade have a better chance to 
become an  actual  partner.  It  is  therefore  concluded that  geographical  proximity  and relative 
balance  of  industry  pressure  groups  explain  which  two  countries  are  more  likely  to  sign  a 
bilateral FTA with one another. 
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